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Better off at home? 
Effects of a nursing home admission on costs, hospitalizations and survival  
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Abstract  
Aging-in-place policies substitute home care for nursing home admissions (NHA). They 
appear to be a win-win by keeping public spending in check and being in line with personal 
preferences, but have hitherto not been evaluated. We study the impact of NHA eligibility 
using Dutch administrative data and exploiting variation between randomly assigned 
assessors in their tendency to grant admission. The impact on mortality is zero, but with 
considerable effect heterogeneity. Moreover, aging-in-place policies come at the cost of 
increased curative care, especially hospital admissions, and do not reduce total healthcare 
spending, suggesting they may not be a win-win after all. 
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I. Introduction 
The rising costs of long-term care (LTC) are a major public policy concern. Aging-in-place 
policies, aimed at postponing nursing home admissions (NHA), are popular and seen as an 
effective way to contain LTC costs (Guo et al. 2015). Since the 1980s, a shift from nursing 
home care towards home care has taken place in the United States (US) (Bishop 1999; 
McKnight 2006) and other developed countries. Among the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the average share of elderly LTC recipients 
receiving care at home increased from 59 percent in 2000 to 65 percent in 2013 (OECD 
2015).  Aging in place is often argued to be a win-win: it keeps costs down by substituting 
cheaper home care for more expensive nursing home care, and it is in line with preferences of 
the elderly, whose satisfaction and quality of life are believed to be higher at home than in a 
nursing home (OECD 2011, 2015; Guo et al. 2015; Kim and Lim 2015). 
Admitting a frail, old person to a nursing home affects his/her health in multiple, possibly 
offsetting, ways. On the one hand, nursing homes provide a protective environment with 
round-the-clock care, and are thus expected to have a positive influence on their residents’ 
health. On the other hand, a NHA may also be detrimental to health, because the transition to 
a nursing home is a major, often irreversible and disruptive, life event and because nursing 
homes probably provide a lower-quality life environment. Finally, nursing homes are “total 
institutions” (Goffman 2009) that take over many aspects of the everyday life of residents. 
This may lead to passivity and dependence, and a (perceived) partial loss of control and of 
one’s identity.  
Healthcare spending may also rise or fall following a NHA: a NHA is expensive because of 
facility costs, living costs1 and the intensity of care provided. Yet, a NHA may be cheaper if 
keeping patients at home requires intensive care that can be provided more efficiently in 
                                                          
1 In The Netherlands, the rent and cost of living in a nursing home are also covered by public LTC insurance. 
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nursing homes, due to economies of scale. Moreover, a NHA may reduce spending on 
medical care, because the nursing home staff takes over tasks from other providers, or the 
care that is provided may prevent accidents warranting a doctor visit or hospitalization. 
Evidence on the effects of aging-in-place policies on NHAs and healthcare spending is 
scarce, however. Kim and Lim (2015) use cut-offs in the design of public LTC insurance 
benefits in South Korea, which include a threshold that elderly with the most severe 
limitations to choose home care over an NHA. For this group, the regression discontinuity 
shows that increased home care spending decreased medical expenditures but had no 
significant impact on total LTC spending and on informal care use.2 Further evidence is 
limited to the evaluation of expansions (see e.g. Marek et al. 2012; Weissert and Frederick 
2013; Guo et al. 2015) and a reduction (McKnight 2006) of home care subsidization in the 
US. The latter set of studies focuses on whether subsidizing home care affects nursing home 
care use and costs, yet do not address the question of what the net health and cost effects of 
actual substitution are. The main reason that the net health effect of a NHA has not been 
studied before is that individuals self-select – patients who receive institutional care are 
usually in worse health than those who continue to live at home – and therefore these groups 
cannot be compared directly3. 
To address this selection problem, we exploit two institutional features of LTC organization 
in The Netherlands. First, virtually all LTC is paid for through the public LTC insurance 
scheme (94 percent of total public LTC expenditures, including all spending on nursing home 
care) or the Social Support Act (6 percent) (CBS 2016). Second, to become eligible for 
publicly funded LTC, patients need to request an assessment from an independent 
                                                          
2 The difference-in-differences analyses that are done as robustness checks reconfirm the zero effect on informal 
care but shows a positive impact on LTC spending and no effect on medical spending (Kim and Lim 2015). 
3 There are some studies that do investigate differences in health and costs between home care and nursing home 
care users, but they rely on observed characteristics to control for differences between the two groups (e.g. 
Chappell et al. (2004). A study done in The Netherlands, which relies on propensity score matching, founnd that 
nursing home care is more expensive than home care (Kok et al. 2013). 
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government agency. While the eligibility criteria are set by the Minister of Health and 
documented in policy guidelines, the assessors working for this agency have considerable 
discretionary power when deciding on an applicant’s eligibility, which we exploit as a source 
of random variation in the probability of becoming eligible for a NHA (see Doyle 2007; 
Maestas et al. 2013; French and Song 2013; Dahl et al. 2014 for applications in other 
settings).   
Our instrumental variable estimates imply that eligibility for a NHA decreases the probability 
of a hospital admission but suggest there is no evidence of an effect on the mortality risk and 
healthcare spending. These results apply to applicants who are sufficiently close to the 
eligibility threshold for the leniency of the assessor to play a crucial role. As this is the prime 
target group of aging-in-place policies, such policies may not be saving healthcare 
expenditures, as generally hypothesized (cf. OECD 2011, De Meijer et al. 2015; Guo et al. 
2015; Kim and Lim 2015). 
 
II. LTC in The Netherlands 
A. LTC 
LTC helps individuals to cope with functional limitations. The focus here is on LTC for the 
elderly – about two-thirds of all LTC recipients4 – who may need help because of limitations 
caused by physical deterioration often related to chronic conditions or psychogeriatric 
problems (e.g. dementia). There are two types of LTC: formal care, provided by paid 
professionals; and informal care, provided by family members, friends or neighbors. We 
concentrate on formal care, which is provided at home or in a nursing home.  
                                                          
4 The other groups receiving LTC are the mentally handicapped, the physically disabled and patients with 
chronic mental illnesses. Together, these groups account for about a third of all LTC users (CBS 2016). 
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With 2.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on public LTC provision (OECD 
2017), The Netherlands has one of the most extensive public LTC systems in the world. 
While in most countries out-of-pocket expenditures on formal care are substantial (OECD 
2011), in The Netherlands virtually all formal care, delivered at home or in institutions, is 
paid for by mandatory social insurance5. Co-payments are relatively low: only 8 percent of 
public expenditure on LTC was financed from co-payments in 2014 (CBS 2016).  
Institutional care is provided in a nursing or residential care home: an environment that is 
adapted to the needs of frail, elderly residents6. The setting and intensity differ depending on 
the needs and health problems. Nursing homes provide intensive care and medical treatment 
to elderly with severe health and psychogeriatric problems. Patients generally stay in one-
person bedrooms. Autonomy, especially for patients with dementia, is very limited. Nursing 
home residents receive care ranging from 3.5 to 33.5 hours per week. In residential care 
homes, the focus is on providing assistance to elderly who cannot live independently. 
Generally, these homes have small apartments where the elderly live on their own or with 
their partners (Kok et al. 2015). Care, meals and day activities are provided, but the elderly 
still have substantial autonomy. 
Home care is formal care, provided by professionals, at home. As covered by Dutch social 
insurance, this includes social support, personal care (assistance with washing, dressing and 
eating) and nursing. The quantity and intensity of care may vary considerably according to 
the (assessed) needs of the elderly: from one hour of personal care per week to around-the-
clock nursing. 
An independent government agency (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg – CIZ) decides the level 
and types of care for which applicants are eligible (see Section 2.2). Individuals who are 
                                                          
5 In addition, public provision of domestic help is funded from general taxation. 
6 Public financing for residential care home stays was terminated in 2013. 
6 
 
eligible for public LTC may choose to receive this care in-kind or to receive a cash transfer 
amounting to about 75 percent of the value of the in-kind services. In-kind care is provided 
by private not-for-profit or for-profit (home care only) providers that are contracted by 
regional single payers. These single payers are allocated a budget based on past spending in 
the region. While this budget is often fully spent, waiting lists are virtually non-existent 
(Bakx et al. 2016a). 
The government has implemented various measures since 2000 to incentivize and facilitate 
the postponement of NHAs. It has increased the supply of home care (from 2000); has 
introduced the option of receiving home care for those eligible for institutional care (2007); 
has increased co-payments for institutional care (2013); and, has tightened the eligibility 
criteria for institutional care (2014) (Alders et al. 2015; De Meijer et al. 2015). 
 
B. The assessment procedure7 
Individuals who may need LTC apply for an assessment to the regional CIZ office, or ask a 
healthcare provider or family member to do so on their behalf. Assessors handle one of three 
types of applications – for elderly care, care for the disabled or long-term mental health care 
– but there is no further specialization. Applications are assigned to assessors by a planner 
taking into account only the priority status of the application8 and assessor workload – but 
not any information about patient’s health or care needs.  
The assessor has access to: i) information filled out on the application form; ii) information 
about prior LTC use; and, iii) any information collected in previous applications. He/she 
decides which information needs to be verified or updated. The assessor may contact the 
                                                          
7 The description of the assessment procedure is based on the rules described in CIZ (2013) and face-to-face 
interviews with a team coach (and former assessor) and a data manager at CIZ. This is an abridged version, the 
full version is in Appendix B. 
8 All applications must be handled within six weeks. However, some applications need to be handled within 24 
or 48 hours. 
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patient, household and family members, the health insurer, and the healthcare providers (e.g. 
the general practitioner [GP] or a LTC provider). The assessment framework requires the 
assessor to take into account the health, health-related limitations, living conditions, social 
environment, psychiatric and social functioning of the applicant, and any other professional 
services and informal care the patient is receiving. The assessor is a street-level bureaucrat 
(Lipsky 2010) who applies general rules to specific cases. To do this, he/she has – and needs 
to have – considerable discretionary power. Assessors have the freedom to determine which 
of the abovementioned aspects are relevant, and to determine which information is verified or 
collected and how this will be done. 
The assessor then decides whether the applicant is eligible for nursing home care or home 
care and, if applicable, the type and amount of home care – nursing, personal care or 
assistance. If the applicant does not agree with the decision, he/she may appeal and the 
decision is reconsidered. The applicant appeals in less than 1percent of cases and 25 percent 
of these appeals are approved (CIZ 2014). The initial decision is usually only reversed 
because new or additional information is made available.  
 
III. Data 
Study population and available information 
The data set consists of all eligibility applications handled by CIZ for the years 2009-20139 
and for which full information on all covariates was available. To create a homogenous study 
population for which the leniency of the assessor is relevant, the population was restricted to 
applicants of at least 65 years of age, who applied for a permanent NHA10 indicating a 
                                                          
9 Thus excluding assessments done by mandated providers. 
10 Including residential care facilities. 
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psychogeriatric or somatic condition (thus excluding the sensory and mentally handicapped) 
and who were not already eligible for a NHA when they applied.  
Applications made by medical specialists or hospitals on behalf of a patient were removed 
because in these cases the type of care requested is virtually always granted. Excluding these 
applications means that the results may not apply to patients experiencing major health 
shocks requiring hospitalization and subsequent post-acute NHA. Finally, applications were 
removed from the sample when the assessor handling the application was unknown or 
handled fewer than 50 of these applications in all the years combined. Excluding these 
applications does not have an effect on the generalizability of the results, as the allocation of 
cases to assessors is arbitrary within a region. 
The eligibility data contain the eligibility decision and information on who filed the 
application, the type of application and whether it was part of the random 5 percent of 
applications that receive a full review (see Appendix B for details). These data were linked at 
the individual level to data on the use of LTC provided in kind (2008-2014)11; vital statistics, 
including death records (2009-2015), household composition (2009-2013), family 
composition (2009-2013) and the distance at which the children live (2009-2013, if 
applicable); household income and household wealth (2009-2013); hospital discharge data 
(2008-2012); and to annual claims data from mandatory public health insurance covering 
roughly two-third of spending on medical care (2009-2014).12  
                                                          
11 Information on the use of support (begeleiding) is only available from2011 onwards. 
12 All these data are available for all applicants, with two exceptions. First, healthcare expenditure data are not 
available for individuals who are insured through a proxy holder (about 10 percent in this subpopulation); 
probability weights are used to correct for this. Second, discharge information is lacking for approximately 10 
percent of all hospital admissions. There is regional variation in the coverage of the registration of hospital 
admissions and hence missing values on these variables are not random but are nonetheless not expected to 
affect the results because we control for the region of residence. 
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The number of observations in the study population is 51,047 for 49,187 individuals; 3.7 
percent applied twice or more, and the maximum number of applications for a NHA by an 
individual is four. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The applicants in the study population were mostly women, who were old and close to death 
(Table 1, Column 1). They also used a lot of health care: medical care expenditures in the 
next calendar year are close to 6000 Euro, almost three times the population average (Bakx et 
al. 2016b). Their prescription drug use suggests a high rate of multimorbidity, e.g. 
cardiovascular problems (52 percent used antithrombotics in ATC category B01), infections 
(antibiotics in J01: 41%) and diabetes (medication in A10: 18%). Of the applicants 30.4 
percent died within two years of the application. Finally, the majority were already eligible 
for home care at the time of the application and used on average about 5.4 hours of home care 
per week in the year prior to the application13.  
Initial (non-)eligibility does not automatically result in (non-)admission. Not all of the 
applicants eligible for a NHA move there: after one year, only 64 percent of those eligible 
had done so, after two years 76 percent (Column 2). By contrast, 27.1 percent of rejected 
applications were admitted within a year and 44.9 percent within two years (Column 3). 
Eligible applicants showed higher mortality rates and lower healthcare spending (conditional 
on surviving until the start of the next calendar year) than non-eligible applicants. This may 
be due to three reasons: i) it may reflect that nursing homes are capable of keeping their 
residents healthier and thus their demand for health care low; ii) nursing homes provide some 
of the care that would otherwise be provided by general practitioners and hospitals and pay 
for prescription drugs; and, iii) selective mortality, i.e. the highest spending nursing home 
residents have the lowest probability of surviving to the end of the calendar year. 
 
  
                                                          
13 This figure comes from a back-of-the-envelope calculation in which we round the cost of one hour of home 
care to 40 Euro and use 11,297 Euro of home-care spending in the year prior to the application. 
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IV. Empirical strategy 
A. Instrumental variable (IV) analysis 
We estimated the effect of eligibility for a nursing home admission (ENHA) on an applicant’s 
outcome y (i.e. survival, healthcare use or healthcare expenditures). For a given applicant 𝑖𝑖,  
suppose that the relationship between ENHA and y follows the model:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = x𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 × 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖, (1) 
where x𝑖𝑖 is a vector containing observed characteristics, and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 is the independent and 
normally distributed error term. It is likely that assessors have more information on the 
applicant’s health than can be gathered from the data, and that they use this in their decision. 
If so, ENHAi is likely to be correlated with unobserved health, and direct estimation of 
Equation (1) using an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) provides a biased estimate of 
the effect γ of ENHAi on the outcome 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. Since applicants in poorer unobserved health are 
more likely to be deemed eligible for a NHA than individuals in better health, we expect an 
upward bias in the OLS estimates of γ in the analyses explaining mortality and NHAs. 
Whether the bias for the effect on healthcare expenditures is also positive is not clear, as it 
depends on two additional factors: i) the degree to which a NHA substitutes for other types of 
care; and,ii) how differences in unobserved health affect the use of these types of care. 
To eliminate the bias, we employed an instrumental variable analysis, in which we exploit the 
fact that ENHAi is partly random. The source of this randomness is that, as described above, 
i) an applicant’s eligibility status is determined by an employee of the needs-assessment 
agency; ii) the allocation of cases to assessors is arbitrary within a region; and,iii) that 
assessors have some discretionary power, with some more likely to judge the same applicants 
as eligible than others, i.e. to be more lenient. Hence, whether the applicant is assessed by a 
more lenient assessor may be used as an instrument for ENHAi in the instrumental variable 
analysis.  
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We summarized the leniency of evaluators in one measure to create a strong instrument14. 
Following Maestas et al. (2013), we defined leniency for application i handled by assessor j 
by taking the share of the other cases for which the assessor considered a NHA appropriate:  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∶=  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗− 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎)�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗−1�   (2) 
We excluded case i itself to ensure that the instrument is exogenous. Assessors with greater 
approval shares are taken to be more lenient.  
Subsequently, we adjusted the leniency measure for region-specific differences and 
differences in the types of applications handled15. Using this standardized estimate of 
Leniencyi as an instrument, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤� , we can obtain an unbiased estimate of γ using the 
following Two-Stage Least Squares regression (2SLS): 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = x𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 × 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜆𝜆 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤� + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (3) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = x𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 × 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (4) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝚤𝚤�  in Equation (4) is the predicted probability of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 from Equation (3). 
 
B. Interpretation 
The interpretation of the results is affected by two aspects. First, we estimated the causal 
effect of eligibility for a NHA, not the effect of an admission itself. Applicants who are 
eligible for a NHA may choose to postpone the admission or to not use any nursing home 
care at all, while applicants who are currently ineligible for a NHA may reapply, become 
                                                          
14 The most straightforward way to exploit the differences between assessors would be to generate an indicator 
variable for each assessor and use this set of indicator variables as instruments. But this strategy would yield a 
large number of instruments for just one endogenous regressor. Furthermore, each of these assessor dummies 
separately would have a small impact on the overall probability of a NHA. As a result, this approach is expected 
to yield biased estimates (Wooldridge 2010, French and Song 2013, Maestas et al. 2013). 
15 More specifically, we use an OLS regression to correct for information about the applications, i.e. the region 
and the period in which the application was submitted; whether the application was filed by a) the patient, b) his 
family doctor, c) his LTC provider, or d) someone else (e.g. a family member); whether it was a) a regular 
application, b) an application that followed a temporarily valid emergency application, or c) another type of 
application. A robustness check in which the leniency score is not adjusted confirms that the instrument is 
strong (results available upon request). We prefer the adjusted leniency score for efficiency reasons. 
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eligible and be admitted later: about half of the control group is admitted at some point in the 
future (Table 1, Column 2). These dynamics imply that we cannot use the current setup to 
study the effects of a NHA on the outcomes: even if the assignment of the eligibility decision 
is completely random, the uptake and timing of nursing home care may still be correlated 
with unobserved (changes in) health (cf. Abbring and Van den Berg 2005; Eberwein et al. 
1997; Cellini et al. 2010).16 
The simplest interpretation of the results is that the eligibility decision is the treatment. 
However, we expect differences between eligible and non-eligible applicants to be solely 
caused by differences in the timing and quantity of use of nursing home care17. Therefore, 
another interpretation is that we are estimating an intention-to-treat effect18 for nursing home 
care: the effect of offering individuals access to the actual treatment, i.e. a NHA.   
Second, the IV analysis provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE): 
the average effect of eligibility for compliers, i.e. those applicants who are at the margin of 
eligibility and for whom the eligibility decision is affected by the assessor’s leniency. Some 
applicants are never eligible for nursing home care, regardless of the assessor’s leniency: the 
never takers. Others – the always takers – are always eligible for nursing home care (e.g. 
because of severe health limitations) even if assessed by the strictest assessor. As the 
compliers might have different characteristics than the always- and never-takers, and the 
                                                          
16 Two approaches would enable using a NHA as the endogenous variable. First, following Abbring and Van 
den Berg (2005) a joint-duration model of admission and outcome may be estimated (see Eberwein et al. 
[1997]). This approach, however, requires restrictive assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved 
effects and preliminary analyses showed the model could not be properly identified using our data.  
The second approach considers admission within an arbitrary time period t after the eligibility decision as the 
endogenous variable and measures outcomes over a subsequent period (t ,t+x). Autor et al. (2015) show that, 
under additional monotonicity assumptions, the estimate can be interpreted as a LATE. Nonetheless, the results 
from this approach (available upon request) do not have straightforward interpretation because the treatment 
differs within the treatment group: some treated individuals are admitted right away, while others only at the end 
of the period t. Hence, it is not clear what effect is being estimated. 
17 It is unlikely that eligibility has a direct effect on the outcomes. 
18 Our approach differs from a design in which the intention to treat is used as an instrument for the treatment; 
this would mean using eligibility as an instrument for actual admission. Instead, we use leniency as an 
instrument for eligibility to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of eligibility not of NHA.  
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effects of ENHA might be heterogeneous, the LATE identifies the average effects for the 
compliers only. 
We cannot identify the compliers individually, but we can examine their group characteristics 
by looking at the relative likelihood of a marginal applicant having a particular characteristic 
relative to the full population of applicants. We did this by dividing subgroup-specific first-
stage coefficients for the leniency measure by the first-stage coefficient for leniency for the 
full population (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
Therefore we estimated the effect of access to nursing home care for individuals who are at 
the margin of eligibility. This seems to be one of the most policy-relevant effects. First, the 
way that policy makers in The Netherlands and a number of other countries often try to 
influence the use of nursing home care is through the eligibility decision (OECD 2011; Bakx 
et al. 2015). Second, such policy changes are likely to mainly affect the compliers. Aging-in-
place policies often entail marginal shifts in the rate at which the elderly move to a nursing 
home. These changes will most likely affect the access to nursing home care for applicants at 
the margin of eligibility, and not for applicants with very severe health problems. 
 
C. Outcomes and selection of covariates 
We considered six outcomes. First and second, we looked at the effect of eligibility on NHAs 
and on LTC expenditures, which consist of spending on home care and nursing home care. 
Third and fourth, we looked at spending on medical care and the probability of having at least 
one hospital admission. A NHA may affect use and costs of curative care by affecting the 
health and survival of the admitted and through substitution: nursing homes pay for some of 
the medical care that would otherwise have been covered by health insurance and a nursing 
home might substitute for hospital care. Fifth and sixth, we estimated the impact on all-cause 
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mortality and on morbidity, as measured by the hospital discharge diagnoses-based Charlson 
index (Sundararajan et al. 2004).  
We controlled for all information available to CIZ when the application was assigned to an 
assessor and added information from the sources described in section III.19 We included 
information on: i) the type and timing of the application; ii) prior use of LTC and health care, 
including detailed information on medicine use; and, iii) socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, including the age, gender, region of residence, household wealth, income and 
household and family composition of the applicants (Table A2 in Appendix A contains a full 
list of covariates).  
 
D. Appraisal of assessor leniency as instrumental variable 
To be a good instrument, the measure of the assessors’ leniency needs to fulfill three 
requirements: it needs to be relevant and valid, and it needs to affect the probability of an 
admission monotonically. 
 
Assumption 1: relevance 
The variation in the leniency of assessors that handle more than 50 cases (n = 455) is 
considerable: the share of patients that are rated as eligible for nursing home care ranges from 
0.53 to 1.0 (standard deviation = 0.08) across assessors.20 After adjusting for differences in 
                                                          
19 We do not include the information on health status and functional limitations collected by the assessor. 
Assessors decide themselves which (additional) information they gather and may interpret situations differently. 
Analyses (available upon request) using detailed information on functional limitations from the Health Care 
Monitor survey of 2% of the population in 2012 show that more lenient assessors are more likely to overreport 
limitations and disabilities. Hence, including the information reported by the assessor would lead to an 
underestimation of the effect of assessor leniency on the probability of being eligible for a NHA and hence to 
overestimation of the health effects of an admission. 
20 Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A contain histograms detailing the distribution of the caseload across the 
assessors and the share of applications that they approve. 
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types of applications handled and regions, the variation is reduced (standard deviation = 0.07) 
but between-assessor differences remain substantial (Figure 1). 
The first-stage estimates presented in Table 2 confirm the relevance of the leniency 
instrument: the significance of the coefficient for leniency, the F-statistic and the partial R2-
statistic show that assessor leniency has a strong effect on the probability of being labeled 
eligible for a NHA. Being assigned to a one standard deviation more lenient assessor 
increases the probability of receiving nursing home care by 6.8 percentage points. 
 
Assumption 2: validity 
As explained in Section C, assessors are assigned to applications by a planner whose main 
goals are: i) to ensure that every application is reviewed on time; and, ii) that assessors have 
an even workload. Applicants cannot pick an assessor and assessors cannot select which 
types of applications they would like to review. This means that the validity of the instrument 
is plausible: the assignment procedure makes it unlikely that the instrument is correlated with 
any (unobservable) characteristics of the applicant.21 
While this claim cannot be verified empirically, we further examined its plausibility by 
testing whether the instrument is correlated with observed characteristics. It is more likely 
that none of the subgroups based on unobserved characteristics is being assessed by more 
lenient assessors, if none of the observed subgroups of applicants on average is assessed by a 
more lenient assessor22. To this end, we inspected which characteristics are correlated with 
assessor leniency by regressing it on the observed characteristics of the applicant (cf. French 
                                                          
21 In addition, the arbitrary assignment of applications to assessors means that Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA) holds, as it rules out serial correlation in the leniency of assessors reviewing applications 
made by the same applicant (or the same group or household). 
22 The crucial assumption is that the observed and unobserved characteristics are correlated, which is highly 
likely in this case because of the availability of information on all aspects influencing the health of the applicant 
and the probability of a NHA, including past health status, socio-economic status, informal care availability and 
demographic background characteristics. 
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and Song 2013).23 Any difference between observable subgroups of applicants in the average 
leniency of their assessors might be a sign of non-random assignment, in particular when the 
difference is in a characteristic that is likely to be connected to the applicant’s unobserved 
health. This regression reveals that when correcting for all other characteristics (and 
correcting for multiple testing using the method developed by Benjamini and Hochberg 
(1995)), there are no between-group differences in assessor leniency (Table A4 in Appendix 
A).  
To further assess the exclusion restriction, we used results from a Least Absolute Shrinkage 
and Selection Operator (Lasso) analysis (see Section V.D). We used this as a robustness 
check to see whether our main results changed when we used automated variable selection 
based on all available information in our data set. As suggested by Belloni et al. (2014), we 
let the Lasso select the covariates for three equations: the first-stage and second-stage 
equations of the 2SLS estimation, and an equation explaining the leniency score. The 
estimation results for the leniency score equation also provide further insight into the validity 
of the IV: if the Lasso does not select any (health-related) variables in the leniency score 
equation, this means that none of the observable variables have strong predictive power for 
leniency. None of the 170 variables were selected for the leniency equation by the Lasso, 
which further confirms that the observed characteristics are uncorrelated with the instrument.  
 
Assumption 3: monotonicity 
The monotonicity assumption means that assessors who are stricter for one group of 
applicants are also stricter for all other subgroups. It implies that the relationship between 
assessor leniency and the probability of being rated eligible to move to a nursing home is 
                                                          
23 A close alternative to this test is to split the population in quartiles using the leniency of the assessor, and to 
test for differences in other characteristics between these quartiles. The results from this test reconfirmed the 
results reported here (full results available upon request). 
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positive for all observable subgroups (French and Song 2013; Dahl et al. 2014). If this 
assumption holds, the leniency measure coefficient will always be nonnegative in subgroup-
specific first-stage regressions. We found that, for all 19 subgroups considered, the first-stage 
coefficients were positive and close to the estimate for the entire population (Table 2).  
Furthermore, a survival analysis of the population that was eligible for nursing home care 
demonstrates that individuals who were assessed by a more lenient assessor move to a 
nursing home at a slower rate (results available upon request). This implies that individuals 
granted a NHA by a stricter assessor are on average less healthy than those granted it by a 
more lenient assessor. Thus, this finding confirms that the monotonicity assumption is not 
rejected (cf. Maestas et al. 2013). 
 
V. Results 
A. Main analyses 
As expected, being granted eligibility for a NHA increases the probability of moving to a 
nursing home (Table 3). This effect varies over time for three reasons: i) because not all those 
eligible move to a nursing home; ii) because those who do move to a nursing home do not 
move there immediately; and, iii) because a large share of applicants initially turned down 
eventually become eligible for a NHA. The effect is 15.6 percentage points after three 
months. It peaks after six months when the impact is 18.4 percentage points, and decreases to 
11.1 percentage points after two years. 
Being eligible for a NHA has no significant impact on mortality. The estimates are not 
significant and closer to zero than the OLS estimates (see Table A5 in Appendix A). Nor 
does it affect morbidity, as measured by the Charlson index. Yet, being eligible for a NHA 
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means that an applicant is 8.9 percentage points (28 percent) less likely to incur a hospital 
admission.24  
Being eligible for a NHA has a large impact on healthcare spending. As a consequence of the 
higher share of patients that are admitted to a nursing home among the eligible, their 
spending on nursing home care is 7,991 Euro higher after a year (12,447 after two years), 
while their home-care expenditures are 6,405 Euro lower (11,137 after two years). Moreover, 
the eligible are estimated to spend 1,500 Euro less on medical care than the ineligible in the 
calendar year after the eligibility decision (Table 3). This drop fully offsets the increase in 
LTC spending, meaning that the total effect of becoming eligible for a NHA on healthcare 
spending is close to zero. This drop in medical care costs is not the result of differences in 
mortality between home care and nursing home care recipients, as the 2SLS shows no 
significant effect of a NHA on mortality. Hence, a NHA limits the need to seek medical help 
and thus medical care spending, either because the nursing home provides this care itself, 
because living in a nursing home improves the health of the residents, or because the nursing 
home staff are able to improve timeliness of medical care. 
 
B. Characteristics of compliers 
The 2SLS and the OLS results are not directly comparable because the 2SLS results apply to 
the compliers, while the OLS results apply to the full population. The size of the compliers 
group is equal to the first-stage coefficient multiplied by the difference between the eligibility 
rate of the least and most-lenient assessor (Maestas et al. 2013). This means that 46 percent of 
the population is at the margin. The group of “always takers” (i.e. those always considered 
eligible) is equal to the share considered eligible by the strictest assessor, while the group of 
                                                          
24 Subsequent analyses on the number of days stayed at the hospital (conditional on one admission), the number 
of unscheduled admissions and on the probability of being admitted at least once for specific groups of 
conditions did not yield significant results (results available upon request). 
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never takers is equal to the share considered ineligible by the most lenient assessor. In our 
case, a large share (54 percent) will always be considered eligible, while there are no never 
takers. The absence of never takers in the study population can be explained by our selection 
of individuals who apply for a NHA who are generally all in poor health. 
The composition of the compliers group is different from the full study population. The 
relative likelihood estimates show that the compliers are substantially more likely to be aged 
80-89 and over than the full study population (Table 2). They are also more likely to be in the 
lowest income quartile, to have submitted their application themselves and to have not been 
eligible for home care in the 30 days before the application. These groups that are 
overrepresented among the compliers might provide more room ─ or more reason ─ for 
discretionary decisions by assessors. The findings also suggest that the difference between 
the OLS estimates and the 2SLS is the result of differences between compliers and the full 
population as well as the impact that self-selection has on the OLS estimates (Dahl et al. 
2015). 
 
C. Subgroup analyses 
Table 4 shows that assessor leniency has a larger impact on ENHA for some groups than for 
others: the effect of assessor leniency was largest for applicants in the 80-90 age group, 
applicants who file the application themselves, and applicants not eligible for home care at 
the time of the application. For these three subgroups, we re-estimate the 2SLS regressions 
for the probability of a NHA, mortality and LTC spending. For the first two subgroups, 
results are very similar to the overall result. However, applicants not eligible for home care at 
the time of application experience a drop of 8.4 percentage points in one-year mortality 
because of ENHA (Table 4). Because individuals in this group apply for a NHA, without 
previously using any form of home care, it seems likely that they have experienced a shock in 
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their health or living conditions. We do, however, not find any consistent evidence for this 
based on their healthcare use prior to their application or changes in their marital status. 
Conversely, the mortality of the group that is eligible for home care when they apply is about 
8.9 percentage points higher one year after they became eligible for a NHA. The effects of 
eligibility on a NHA and on LTC spending are similar for both subgroups and equal to those 
for the total population. 
Effects of NHA eligibility might also differ across groups with different unobserved 
characteristics (e.g. unobserved health). Estimating the marginal treatment effects is one way 
to test for heterogeneous treatment effects over unobserved characteristics (Heckman et al., 
2006). If we suppose there is only one unobservable factor (unobserved health) then 
differences in leniency (conditional on the observables) across assessors can be interpreted as 
differences in the threshold the assessors apply regarding this unobserved factor: lenient 
assessors apply a lower threshold with regard to unobserved health than strict assessors. The 
differences in leniency across assessors, which should be uncorrelated to unobserved health, 
allow us to estimate effects for different margins of eligibility by first estimating the 
propensity of eligibility based on leniency, and then estimating the outcome as a function of 
this propensity score25.  
We estimate marginal treatment effects with NHA and mortality as outcomes. We do not find 
evidence of heterogeneity in the outcomes according to the propensity score26. These findings 
(available upon request) suggest that the effects of eligibility for a NHA do not differ across 
individuals with different severity of unobserved health problems. However, the effects can 
                                                          
25 Specifically, we follow a similar approach to Maestas et al. (2013) and proceed in four steps. We first 
estimate an adjusted leniency measure correcting for all covariates used in the main analysis. Second, we 
estimate a probit model of eligibility on this indicator. The predictions from this model provide the propensity 
score (i.e. the predicted probability of being eligible). Third, we regress the outcomes on this score, using a local 
polynomial regression model. Fourth, numerically taking derivatives of this model gives the marginal treatment 
effects.  
26 The estimates depend very strongly on the functional form (order of the polynomial) that is chosen and even a 
second-order polynomial seems to suffer from overfitting. However, scatterplots of the average outcome by 
percentiles of the propensity score clearly show there is no heterogeneity in the effects.   
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only be identified for compliers; always takers are likely to be in worse unobserved health 
than compliers. The results therefore cannot be generalized to the elderly population with 
very severe unobserved health problems. Furthermore, the idea of a single unobserved 
(health) factor may be an oversimplification of reality. When there is more than one factor 
that determines the eligibility decisions of the assessors (e.g. multiple health dimensions, 
such as  morbidity, disability and frailty [Fried et al. 2004], or other factors such as living 
conditions), then the interpretation of the marginal treatment effects is less clear-cut since it 
becomes impossible to distinguish between the effects of the different factors. 
 
D. Robustness checks 
We performed three sets of robustness checks to verify whether the main results are sensitive 
to: i) the definition of the leniency measure; ii) decisions about the selection of control 
variables for applicant health status; and, iii) the linearity assumption for the instrument 
underlying the 2SLS regression models. The first set of tests revealed that the results are 
largely insensitive to decreasing (to 20 or 40 handled applications) or increasing (to 60, 80 or 
100 applications) the threshold used to select assessors with sufficient numbers of 
observations to reliably calculate their leniency27. Further, using a version of the leniency 
measure that has not been corrected for characteristics of the application reconfirms the main 
analysis, except for the one-year mortality estimate, which is significant at the p < 0.05 level 
(Table 5). Finally, we tested if inexperienced assessors may receive an easier caseload (which 
would bias their leniency scores downward) by leaving out the 2.2 percent of applications 
handled by an assessor with fewer than 100 applications in the prior year.28 Leaving out these 
                                                          
27 We document one exception: the one-year mortality effect of ENHA becomes positive and significant at the p 
< 0.05 level when the threshold is set at 80 applications (but not at 100 applications). 
28 To measure the experience of the assessor, all types of application are taken into account, not just the type of 
applications used in the main analysis.  
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applications does not alter the main result: there is a positive effect of being eligible for a 
NHA on the admission probability but not on mortality (Table 5). 
Second, to gauge whether there is omitted variable bias related to the health of the applicants, 
as a first step we included information on spending on five categories of medical care – 
hospital care, paramedical care, medical devices, medical transport and all other medical care 
– in the calendar year prior to the application.29 For all outcomes, results are identical to those 
in Section V.A. 
To further verify whether we selected the correct covariates, we started with a much larger set 
of covariates including very detailed information on outpatient medicine use and diagnosis 
information from hospital admissions from the year prior to the application to the set of 
covariates used in the main analyses30 and let the Lasso developed by Tibshirani (1996) 
select relevant covariates in a data-driven way (Appendix C contains further details about the 
procedure). Specifically, we let the Lasso select the covariates that are associated with the 
endogenous variable, the instrument or the probability of a NHA (Belloni et al. 2014). This 
algorithm allowed us to consider a much larger set of covariates in a more structured way 
than we could do otherwise. The Lasso selected only a small share of the covariates included 
in the main analyses, and only four of the hospital diagnoses groups that were not included. 
The 2SLS results are not affected by the covariate selection. 
Third, we verified whether the assumption that the effect of the instrument on eligibility for a 
NHA is linear by using dummy variables for ten leniency deciles as instruments rather than 
the continuous measure (cf. Dahl et al. 2015). The dummies revealed a linear effect and the 
estimates for the probability of a NHA and for mortality are very similar to the results with 
                                                          
29 This information is not available for patients applying in 2009 and hence these observations (n = 3,696) were 
removed. 
30 Specifically, we added the categories of the International Shortlist for Hospital Morbidity Tabulation 
(ISHMT) and all ATC level-4 codes to the set of potential covariates.  
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the continuous measure. Hence, the assumption of a linear instrument effect appears to have 
no effect on the estimates. 
 
VI. Discussion and conclusion  
The share of elderly living in nursing homes has been declining steadily in recent decades. 
This is one of the most striking trends in LTC, with potentially far-reaching consequences for 
the health and well-being of the elderly as well as for (publicly financed) expenditures. But 
how large are these consequences really? This article sheds light on this question using a 
quasi-experimental approach. 
In order to obtain a causal estimate of the effects of a NHA, we exploited two unique features 
of the Dutch institutional context. First, patients need to apply for eligibility for a NHA and 
these applications are reviewed by arbitrarily assigned assessors who differ in their leniency 
to grant eligibility. Second, virtually all LTC is publicly funded (CBS 2017), meaning that 
there are almost no options to bypass the public system – and hence the eligibility application 
procedure – and there are few other barriers to LTC use.  
We find that for a substantial share of the elderly applying for a NHA, eligibility is affected 
by the leniency of the assessor handling their case. For this group, our two main findings are 
as follows. First, on average, eligibility for a NHA has no effect on mortality, nor does it 
affect health as measured by the Charlson index. Eligibility does, however, reduce the 
probability of having at least one hospital admission in the year following the eligibility 
decision.  
The point estimate for the full population hides considerable heterogeneity of the effect of 
eligibility on mortality: ENHA leads to a sharp, but transient, increase in mortality for elderly 
who were using home care at the time of their application. Conversely, eligibility leads to a 
temporary decline in mortality for elderly who did not use home care at the time of their 
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application. Discussions with experts and analysis of background characteristics of these 
subgroups did not provide insight into the underlying reason for this heterogeneity. 
Second, ENHA has no impact on total healthcare spending. While nursing home care is 
expensive, the eligible would otherwise have absorbed an amount of home care that is almost 
equally expensive. Moreover, a NHA leads to cost savings through a substantial reduction in 
spending on medical care. While the estimate of the effect on LTC spending is in line with 
the findings presented in Kim and Lim (2015), they find a small positive effect of a NHA on 
medical care. 
These findings imply that aging-in-place policies might not be the win-win they are often 
argued to be. While postponing a NHA does not seem to come at the cost of higher mortality 
risk, it does increase the risk of a hospital admission. Moreover, postponing NHAs does not 
lead to any cost savings. Such savings have often been cited as the main goal of these policies 
(OECD 2011). However, our analysis suggests that the health problems of the LTC 
applicants at the margin of eligibility are so severe that intensive care is needed to enable 
them to continue living at home. Our results indicate that provision of these intensive types of 
care at home might actually not be cost saving at all, possibly due to lack of (economies of) 
scale. 
While our analysis sheds light on the causal effects of nursing home care on health and costs, 
we could not estimate all relevant societal costs and benefits of a NHA. Such a complete 
analysis is inhibited by a lack of information on a number of outcomes, the most important 
ones being the well-being of the patients and the health, well-being, and labor supply of the 
informal caregivers. It is an important finding that substitution to home care does not have 
major effects on health, but elderly do not only move to a nursing homes to prevent 
deterioration of their health. Rather, they might also move there to be able to cope with their 
health problems and limitations, and to lead a meaningful life despite these problems. 
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Unfortunately, population-wide quality of life or happiness measures for people receiving 
home care or living in a nursing home are not available31. The same is true for data on 
informal care provision. A NHA is likely to affect the demand for informal care which, in 
turn, may have an impact on the health and wellbeing of the informal caregiver.  
When generalizing the results to other institutional settings, two things are important. First, 
we have estimated a LATE for a specific subgroup. Our sample is restricted to applicants 
who themselves request eligibility for a NHA. It is likely that elderly with relatively mild 
health problems will (almost) never apply for nursing home care but rather for home care, 
and our sample thus excludes the applicants with the least severe health problems. Our 
estimates also do not pertain to applicants in such poor health that they are determined 
eligible even by the strictest assessors. 
Second, the context of the Dutch LTC system should be taken into account. On the one hand, 
The Netherlands still has a relatively large proportion of its population aged over 65 years 
residing in nursing homes: 5.3 percent in 2014 compared to the OECD average of 3.8 percent 
(OECD 2017). It is therefore conceivable that relatively healthy patients are admitted to 
nursing homes, implying that the group of elderly for whom home care is a reasonable 
alternative is probably smaller in countries with a less comprehensive system. If we believe 
that home care is relatively expensive for elderly with more severe health problems, a cost-
saving effect of more home-care provision is even less likely for them. On the other hand, 
The Netherlands also has very extensive publically financed home-care provision. This 
means that, compared to other countries, individuals who are not eligible for a NHA still 
receive substantial home care, which may explain the similarity of health outcomes, but also 
the limited difference in costs.  
                                                          
31 Kok et al. (2013) report that elderly in nursing homes are happier than elderly receiving care at home, but they 
rely on propensity score matching to identify effects. 
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A final important element of the Dutch system is the assessment procedure: applicants who 
are not eligible for a NHA now, can reapply later and obtain quick access to a nursing home 
if their health problems worsen. In such a system, a strict initial assessment may be less 
consequential for health as it prevents unnecessary admissions for elderly who can indeed 
stay at home, while elderly for whom an admission is needed can still get access to a nursing 
home in time.  
All in all, and perhaps somewhat surprising, we conclude that – at the margin, and taking into 
account the kind of outcomes that we can observe like mortality and costs – the current Dutch 
LTC system does not seem to suffer from any serious misallocation of resources. Had we 
found that the implicit admission eligibility thresholds used by the assessment procedure led 
to substantial additional costs or mortality risks at either side of the threshold, then it could 
have been appropriate to recommend a more or a less lenient procedure to rectify this 
situation. Based on our findings, however, the current system seems to get the balance 
between home care and nursing home care right, at least on average. 
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Figure 1: distribution of the leniency measure  
 
Note: the leniency measure is adjusted for the type of the application, the period and the region of residence of 
the applicant. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: group means 
 Study 
population 
Eligible for nursing home 
admission (NHA) 
Difference 
between 
subgroups 
 mean No Yes  
Endogenous variable     
ENHA 0.835 0 1 - 
     
Instrument     
Leniency of the evaluator 0 -0.028 0.006 -0.034*** 
     
Outcomes     
Mortality     
3-month 0.042 0.020 0.047 -0.027*** 
6-month 0.085 0.046 0.092 -0.046*** 
1-year 0.161 0.104 0.172 -0.068*** 
1.5-year 0.232 0.160 0.247 -0.086*** 
2-year 0.304 0.217 0.321 -0.104*** 
     
Admitted to a nursing home within:     
3 months 0.289 0.055 0.335 -0.279*** 
6 months 0.425 0.137 0.482 -0.344*** 
1 year 0.581 0.271 0.642 -0.371*** 
1.5 years 0.657 0.373 0.712 -0.339*** 
2 years 0.712 0.449 0.763 -0.314*** 
     
0
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Long-term care expenditures     
Nursing home care in the next year 14142.83 4302.03 16087.21 -11785.18*** 
Nursing home care in the next 2 years 34882.67 16254.36 38504.68 -22250.32*** 
Home care in the next year 15107.34 14104.28 15305.52 -1201.24*** 
Home care in the next 2 years 23023.45 26013.00 22442.18 3570.82*** 
     
Medical care expenditures     
Next calendar year 5951.92 7582.64 5620.00 1962.64*** 
Next 2 calendar years 11225.97 13973.57 10640.69 3332.88*** 
     
Total healthcare expenditures     
Next calendar year 39786.97 31113.03 41552.46 -10439.43*** 
Next 2 calendar years 84074.89 68206.05 87455.20 -19249.15*** 
     
Hospital care use     
≥ 1 hospital admission in the next year 0.32 0.358 0.312 0.046*** 
Charlson score in the next year 0.258 0.266 0.257 0.009 
     
Covariatesa     
Eligible for home care in the past 30 days 0.723 0.677 0.732 -0.054*** 
     
Applicant     
Patient 0.296 0.48 0.259 0.221*** 
GP 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.002*** 
LTC provider 0.294 0.176 0.317 -0.141*** 
Otherb 0.383 0.316 0.398 -0.082*** 
     
Application type     
Regular 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.000 
After emergency LTC 0.013 0.011 0.013 -0.003** 
Other 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.002** 
Random sample getting full assessment 0.035 0.029 0.036 -0.007*** 
     
Sociodemographics     
Age 82.73 82.13 82.85 -0.72*** 
Female 0.66 0.663 0.659 0.004 
Household size 1.47 1.47 1.46 0.01 
Number of children 2.42 2.44 2.42 0.02 
Number of children in household 0.044 0.046 0.043 0.003 
Widowed in last year 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.003** 
Widowed in last three months 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.001 
Standardized household incomed 19954 19338 20075 -737*** 
Wealth 189676 169172 193727 -24555*** 
Home owner 0.335 0.314 0.339 -0.025*** 
Value of the home 99983 92885 101385 -8500*** 
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Past long-term care spending     
Home care last year 11298 6108 12323 -6215*** 
Home care past two years 15606 9244 16864 -7620*** 
Nursing home care past two years 138.49 141.46 137.90 3.563 
     
Prescription drug use     
ATC category B01 0.515 0.571 0.503 0.068*** 
ATC category J01 0.405 0.453 0.395 0.057*** 
ATC category A10 0.188 0.227 0.181 0.046*** 
     
Number of observations 51047 8406 42641  
*** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. a Descriptive statistics for period in which application was filed, the region 
of residence and other categories of prescription drug use in Table A2 in Appendix A. b Includes family 
members and client representatives; c Descent following Statistics Netherlands definition: applicants classified as 
of foreign descent if they or one of their parents born abroad; e Household income divided by square root of 
number of household members. 
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Table 2: First-stage estimation results by subgroup 
 Effect of leniency 
(λ) 
Relative 
likelihood 
Observations 
Full population 0.973 (0.023)*** 1 51047 
    
Women 1.012 (0.028)*** 1.04 33675 
Healthcare spending last year    
  1st quartile 0.782 (0.041)*** 0.80 12414 
  2nd quartile 1.014 (0.047)*** 1.04 12452 
- 3rd quartile 1.058 (0.048)*** 1.09 12447 
  4th quartile 1.054 (0.049)*** 1.08 12446 
Age    
  65-69 0.776 (0.130)*** 0.80 1746 
  70-79 0.920 (0.043)*** 0.95 13916 
  80-89 1.038 (0.031)*** 1.07 27748 
  90 and over 0.851 (0.054)*** 0.87 7637 
Home care user    
  Yes 0.901 (0.026)*** 0.93 14158 
  No 1.140 (0.047)*** 1.17 36889 
Prior nursing home admission    
  Yes 0.968 (0.023)*** 0.99 2947 
  No  1.080 (0.092)*** 1.11 48100 
Applicant    
  Patient 1.446 (0.048)*** 1.49 15097 
  LTC provider 0.724 (0.035)*** 0.74 14989 
  Other 0.774 (0.038)*** 0.80 20961 
Standardized household income    
  1st quartile 1.040 (0.049)*** 1.07 12761 
  2nd quartile 0.959 (0.049)*** 0.99 12761 
  3rd quartile 1.051 (0.049)*** 1.08 12763 
  4th quartile 0.839 (0.048)*** 0.86 12762 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. All regressions control for period, 
region, type of application, demographics and household characteristics and healthcare spending in the previous 
calendar year. 
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Table 3: The impact of becoming eligible for a nursing home admission (NHA) 
 A NHA within: 
 3 months 6 months 1 year 1.5 year 2 year 
Effect of ENHA (γ) 0.156 
(0.028)*** 
0.205 
(0.031)*** 
0.184 
(0.031)*** 
0.137 
(0.032)*** 
0.111 
(0.031)*** 
      
First stage      
Effect of leniency 
(λ) 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.963 
(0.026)*** 
0.963 
(0.026)*** 
F-statistic leniency  
(p-value) 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1379 
(0.000)*** 
1379 
(0.000)*** 
Partial R2 leniency 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Number of 
observations 
51047 51047 51047 44261 44261 
 
 Mortality within: Having ≥ 1 
hospital 
admission 
Charlson 
index 
 3 months 6 months Next year 1.5 years 2 years Next year Next year 
Effect of 
ENHA (γ) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.032 
(0.023) 
0.022 
(0.026) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
-0.089 
(0.040)** 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
        
First stage        
Effect of 
leniency (λ) 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.955 
(0.032)*** 
0.955 
(0.032)*** 
F-statistic  
(p-value) 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
918 
(0.000)*** 
918 
(0.000)*** 
Partial R2  0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.034 
Number of 
observations 
51047 51047 51047 51047 51047 29391 29371 
 
 Nursing home care 
expenditures 
Home care expenditures Medical care 
expenditures 
Total expenditures 
 Next year 2 years later Next year 2 years later Next 
calendar 
year 
2 next 
calendar 
years 
Next 
calendar 
year 
2 next 
calendar 
years 
Effect of 
ENHA (γ) 
7991.49 
(1095.55)*** 
12447.46 
(2444.58)*** 
-6404.96 
(1204.09)*** 
-11137.42 
(2262.34)*** 
-1500.34 
(620.637)** 
-1419.60 
(1077.12) 
619.49 
(1688.525) 
1358.60 
(3315.30  
         
First stage         
Effect of 
leniency (λ) 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.963 
(0.026)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
0.963 
(0.026)*** 
0.991 
(0.026)*** 
1.021 
(0.031)*** 
0.991 
(0.026)*** 
1.021 
(0.031)*  
F-statistic  
(p-value) 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1379 
(0.000)*** 
1599 
(0.000)*** 
1379 
(0.000)*** 
1422 
(0.000)*** 
1075 
(0.000)*** 
1422 
(0.000)*** 
1075 
(0.000)*  
Partial R2  0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 
Number of 
observations 
51047 44261 51047 44261 44064 31986 44064 31986 
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Table 4: Subgroup analyses  
 Home care user Not a home care 
user 
Applicant is 
patient 
Age: 80-90 
Effect of ENHA on:     
1-year mortality 0.089 (0.030)*** -0.084 (0.034)** 0.006 (0.025) 0.026 (0.028) 
2-year mortality 0.028 (0.037) -0.060 (0.043) -0.000 (0.032) -0.012 (0.035) 
1-year nursing home admission 0.184 (0.038)*** 0.156 (0.051)*** 0.210 
(0.038)*** 
0.150 
(0.039)*** 
2-year nursing home admission 0.113 (0.039)*** 0.081 (0.051)    0.156 
(0.040)*** 
0.088 (0.039)**  
1-year nursing home care 
spending 
8633.287 
(1440.858)*** 
6295.128 
(1585.091)*** 
4014.789 
(1023.326)*** 
8037.695 
(1321.929)*** 
2-year nursing home care 
spending 
12121.929 
(3263.397)*** 
11181.462 
(3474.033)*** 
8401.952 
(2496.820)*** 
11136.709 
(3006.009)*** 
1-year home care spending -6983.781 
(1657.664)*** 
-4702.529 
(1370.344)*** 
-3657.784 
(1106.942)*** 
-7831.589 
(1492.073)*** 
2-year home care spending -11375.838 
(3121.556)*** 
-9350.112 
(2729.587)*** 
-8050.732 
(2291.375)*** 
-10702.293 
(2800.084)*** 
     
First stagea     
Effect of leniency (λ) 0.901 (0.028)*** 1.140 (0.050)*** 1.446 
(0.049)*** 
1.038 
(0.034)*** 
F-statistic leniency (p-value) 1067 (0.000)*** 511 (0.000)*** 859 (0.000)*** 960 (0.000)*** 
Partial R2 leniency 0.032 0.041 0.057 0.038 
Number of observations 36889 14158 15097 27748 
a First-stage coefficient applicable to full sample. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p < 0.05. In all regressions we control for period, region, type of application, demographics and 
household characteristics and healthcare spending in the previous calendar year. 
  
Table 5: Robustness checks 
 Experienced 
assessors only 
Excluding all 
applications of 
the same type 
when calculating 
leniency 
Using leniency 
decile indicators 
as instruments 
Leniency 
measure 
calculated using 
last year’s 
observations 
only 
Effect of ENHA on:     
1-year mortality 0.034 (0.023) 0.046 (0.039) 0.035 (0.023) -0.059 (0.064) 
2-year mortality 0.002 (0.028) -0.014 (0.048) 0.001 (0.029) -0.052 (0.076) 
1-year nursing home admission 0.195 (0.031)*** 0.079 (0.052) 0.181 (0.031)*** 0.088 (0.079) 
2-year nursing home admission 0.120 (0.031)*** -0.007 (0.053) 0.109 (0.031)*** -0.029 (0.087) 
1-year nursing home care 
spending 
7976.648 
(1100.007)*** 
6613.110 
(1914.440)*** 
8396.388 
(1114.071)*** 
9153.860 
(2974.500)*** 
2-year nursing home care 
spending 
12245.619 
(2453.391)*** 
8090.022 
(4306.991)* 
13632.275 
(2481.590)*** 
8284.951 
(7219.529) 
1-year home care spending -6506.958 
(1207.847)*** 
-8609.861 
(2123.677)*** 
-6026.848 
(1218.730)*** 
-11074.410 
(3341.277)*** 
2-year home care spending -11360.770 
(2267.963)*** 
-13242.207 
(4045.018)*** 
-11106.662 
(2304.496)*** 
-18770.467 
(6605.768)*** 
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First stagea     
Effect of leniency (λ) 0.979 (0.025)*** 0.592 (0.024)*** b 0.379 
(0.023)*** 
F-statistic leniency  
(p-value) 
1590 (0.000)*** 596 (0.000)*** 193 (0.000)*** 263 (0.000)*** 
Partial R2 leniency 0.035 0.014 0.034 0.01 
Number of observations 49942 43113 51047 28440 
 
 Only observations 
from 2011 
Controlling for 
confounding through 
additional health 
information  
Using the Lasso 
to select 
covariatesc 
Effect of ENHA on:    
1-year mortality 0.021 (0.047) 0.036 (0.023) 0.035 (0.029) 
2-year mortality -0.042 (0.056) 0.008 (0.028) -0.011 (0.037) 
1-year nursing home admission 0.155 (0.058)*** 0.193 (0.031)*** 0.182 (0.041)*** 
2-year nursing home admission 0.053 (0.054) 0.117 (0.031)*** 0.102 (0.038)*** 
1-year nursing home care 
spending 
6036.218 
(2033.050)*** 
8173.871 
(1103.299)*** 
8080.507 
(1392.954)*** 
2-year nursing home care 
spending 
11070.306 
(4437.200)** 
12574.342 
(2462.825)*** 
15625.291 
(3036.446)*** 
1-year home care spending -8853.132 
(2404.436)*** 
-6668.339 
(1215.251)*** 
-4734.161 
(1657.113)*** 
2-year home care spending -16020.591 
(4121.336)*** 
-11616.974 
(2277.829)*** 
-11411.966 
(2910.635)*** 
    
First stagea    
Effect of leniency (λ) 0.852 (0.039)*** 0.977 (0.025)*** 0.954 (0.030)*** 
 
F-statistic leniency  
(p-value) 
480 (0.000)*** 1574 (0.000)*** 903 (0.000)*** 
Partial R2 leniency 0.03 0.035 0.034 
Number of observations 18144 49759 30065 
 
 Lower bound on the number of observations needed to the calculate leniency of an assessor 
 20 40 60 80 100 
Effect of ENHA 
on: 
     
1-year mortality 0.024 (0.019) 0.035 (0.022) 0.031 (0.023) 0.058 (0.026)** 0.046 (0.030) 
2-year mortality -0.011 (0.024) -0.000 (0.027) -0.007 (0.029) 0.017 (0.033) -0.009 (0.038) 
1-year nursing 
home admission 
0.237 
(0.027)*** 
0.189 
(0.029)*** 
0.185 (0.031)*** 0.156 
(0.035)*** 
0.159 
(0.041)*** 
2-year nursing 
home admission 
0.140 
(0.027)*** 
0.118 
(0.030)*** 
0.113 (0.031)*** 0.069 (0.036)* 0.072 (0.042)* 
1-year nursing 
home care 
spending 
7038.263 
(933.167)*** 
7634.662 
(1045.668)*** 
7714.693 
(1109.888)*** 
8206.570 
(1255.915)*** 
7730.504 
(1450.847)*** 
2-year nursing 
home care 
spending 
10562.006 
(2078.024)*** 
11481.562 
(2338.268)*** 
11987.496 
(2487.653)*** 
13044.128 
(2845.953)*** 
11924.927 
(3295.639)*** 
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1-year home care 
spending 
-4535.525 
(998.934)*** 
-5966.951 
(1138.956)*** 
-6764.837 
(1218.846)*** 
-6981.734 
(1391.035)*** 
-7588.123 
(1587.319)*** 
2-year home care 
spending 
-8234.621 
(1882.341)*** 
-10387.997 
(2140.710)*** 
-11661.382 
(2297.886)*** 
-11656.574 
(2654.395)*** 
-11422.365 
(3037.802)*** 
 0.024 (0.019) 0.035 (0.022) 0.031 (0.023) 0.058 (0.026)** 0.046 (0.030) 
First stagea      
Effect of leniency 
(λ) 
0.955 
(0.021)*** 
0.963 
(0.023)*** 
0.970 (0.025)*** 0.971 
(0.027)*** 
0.976 
(0.031)*** 
F-statistic leniency  
(p-value) 
2021 (0.000) 1735 (0.000) 1558 (0.000) 1248 (0.000) 967 (0.000) 
Partial R2 leniency 0.04 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.03 
Number of 
observations 
56075 52786 48985 42789 35542 
aFor population with at least one year of data available. b Coefficients for nine decile dummies range from .047 
(.008)*** for the second decile to .232 (.007)*** for the tenth. c Covariates selected by the Lasso algorithm are: 
five period dummy variables, two region dummies, sixteen age-gender dummy variables, an indicator for being 
from Netherlands Antillean descent, ATC codes A02, A16, B01, B03, C01, C03, G04, H02, L01, L02, M01, 
M04, N06, R03 and Y, ISHMT codes 202, 501, 1006, and 1302, whether application was filed by the patient 
herself, whether application was filed by a care provider, household size and whether the patient is eligible for 
home care at the date of application. The lambda statistic is 1789.965802 
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Appendix A: Additional results 
 
Figure A.1: the number of applications for a nursing home admission per assessor 
 
Note: assessors who handled fewer than 50 applications for a NHA are removed.  
 
Figure A.2: distribution of the raw leniency measure  
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Table A2: Additional descriptive statistics 
 Total sample Not eligible Eligible Difference 
2009, first half year 0.034 0.052 0.030 0.022*** 
2009, second half year 0.049 0.069 0.045 0.023*** 
2010, first half year 0.065 0.082 0.062 0.021*** 
2010, second half year 0.120 0.119 0.121 -0.001 
2011, first half year 0.192 0.177 0.194 -0.017*** 
2011, second half year 0.164 0.135 0.170 -0.035*** 
2012, first half year 0.139 0.125 0.142 -0.018*** 
2012, second half year 0.104 0.096 0.106 -0.01*** 
2013, first half year 0.082 0.093 0.080 0.012*** 
2013, second half year 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.002 
     
Region     
1 0.164 0.126 0.170 -0.044*** 
2 0.036 0.060 0.031 0.028*** 
3 0.074 0.109 0.068 0.041*** 
4 0.109 0.101 0.111 -0.010*** 
5 0.077 0.089 0.074 0.015*** 
6 0.131 0.130 0.132 -0.002 
7 0.119 0.109 0.121 -0.012*** 
8 0.117 0.098 0.120 -0.022*** 
9 0.125 0.133 0.124 0.009** 
10 0.048 0.045 0.049 -0.004* 
     
Not of foreign descentc 0.893 0.878 0.896 -0.018*** 
Turkey 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.008*** 
Morocco 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003*** 
Suriname 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.004*** 
Netherlands Antilles 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
Western 0.087 0.089 0.087 0.003 
Other non-Western 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.002*** 
     
Used medicine from ATC category     
A02 (Drugs for acid-related disorders) 0.411 0.480 0.398 0.082*** 
A03 (Drugs for functional gastrointestinal disorders) 0.063 0.072 0.062 0.010*** 
A04 (Anti-emetics and antinauseants) 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.001 
A06 (Drugs for constipation) 0.270 0.303 0.263 0.040*** 
A07 (Antidiarrheals, intestinal anti-
inflammatory/anti-infective agents) 
0.035 0.040 0.034 0.006*** 
A10 (Drugs used in diabetes) 0.188 0.227 0.181 0.046*** 
A11 (Vitamins) 0.077 0.083 0.076 0.007** 
A12 (Mineral supplements) 0.189 0.204 0.186 0.018*** 
B01 (Antithrombotic agents) 0.515 0.571 0.503 0.068*** 
B02 (Antihemorrhagics) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.000 
B03 (Anti-anemic preparations) 0.143 0.155 0.141 0.015*** 
B05 (Blood substitutes and perfusion solutions) 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.001 
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C01 (Cardiac therapy) 0.190 0.220 0.184 0.036*** 
C02 (Antihypertensives) 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.004*** 
C03 (Diuretics) 0.390 0.451 0.378 0.073*** 
C05 (Vasoprotectives) 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.004*** 
C07 (Beta Blocking Agents) 0.362 0.414 0.352 0.062*** 
C08 (Calcium channel blockers) 0.177 0.209 0.170 0.038*** 
C09 (Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin 
system) 
0.384 0.452 0.371 0.081*** 
C10 (Lipid modifying agents) 0.313 0.366 0.303 0.064*** 
D01 (Antifungals for dermatological use) 0.053 0.060 0.052 0.008*** 
D02 (Emollients and protectives) 0.167 0.185 0.163 0.022*** 
D05 (Antipsoriatics) 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.002* 
D06 (Antibiotics and chemotherapeutics for 
dermatological use) 
0.072 0.081 0.070 0.011*** 
D07 (Corticosteroids, dermatological preparations) 0.177 0.215 0.170 0.046*** 
D11 (Other dermatological preparations) 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.002** 
G01 (Gynecological anti-infectives and antiseptics) 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.002** 
G03 (Sex hormones and modulators of the genital 
system) 
0.019 0.021 0.019 0.002 
G04 (Urologicals) 0.108 0.122 0.105 0.017*** 
H02 (Corticosteroids for systemic use) 0.140 0.184 0.131 0.053*** 
H03 (Thyroid therapy) 0.071 0.080 0.070 0.010*** 
H04 (Pancreatic hormones) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 
J01 (Antibacterials for systemic use) 0.405 0.453 0.395 0.057*** 
J02 (Antimycotics for systemic use) 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.003** 
J05 (Antivirals for systemic use) 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.003*** 
J07 (Vaccines) 0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.001 
L01 (Antineoplastic agents) 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.006*** 
L02 (Endocrine therapy) 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.002 
L04 (Immunosuppressants) 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.006*** 
M01 (Anti-inflammatory and antirheumatic 
products) 
0.126 0.159 0.120 0.039*** 
M04 (Anti-gout preparations) 0.036 0.044 0.035 0.010*** 
M05 (Drugs for treatment of bone diseases) 0.097 0.116 0.094 0.022*** 
N01 (Anesthetics) 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.005*** 
N02 (Analgesics) 0.245 0.299 0.234 0.065*** 
N03 (Anti-epileptics) 0.047 0.056 0.045 0.011*** 
N04 (Anti-pParkinson drugs) 0.029 0.033 0.028 0.005*** 
N05 (Psycholeptics) 0.216 0.182 0.223 -0.041*** 
N06 (Psychoanaleptics) 0.249 0.220 0.254 -0.034*** 
N07 (Other nervous system drugs) 0.038 0.049 0.036 0.013*** 
P01 (Antiprotozoals)   0.007 0.009 0.006 0.003*** 
R01 (Nasal preparations) 0.040 0.051 0.038 0.014*** 
R03 (Drugs for obstructive airway diseases) 0.177 0.226 0.167 0.059*** 
R05 (Cough and cold preparations) 0.037 0.047 0.035 0.012*** 
R06 (Antihistamines for systemic use) 0.051 0.063 0.048 0.015*** 
S01 (Ophthalmologicals) 0.230 0.270 0.222 0.048*** 
S02 (Otologicals) 0.026 0.033 0.025 0.008*** 
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V03 (All other therapeutic products) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000 
Y (ATC code not filled in) 0.089 0.093 0.088 0.005 
 
Table A3: First-stage estimation results 
 Nursing home admission advised    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effect of leniency (λ) 0.988 
(0.024)*** 
0.989 
(0.023)*** 
0.988 
(0.023)*** 
0.988 
(0.023)*** 
0.989 
(0.023)*** 
0.973 
(0.023)*** 
Controlling for:       
Period  X X X X X 
Region   X X X X 
Type of application    X X X 
Demographics and household 
characteristics 
    X X 
Healthcare use      X 
       
Number of observations 51047 51047 51047 51047 51047 51047 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.04 0.049 0.082 0.09 0.106 
Number of independent 
variables 
1 10 19 26 111 170 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
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Table A4: Regression of leniency on all covariates 
 Coefficient 
2009, second half year 0.000 
2010, first half year 0.000 
2010, second half year -0.001 
2011, first half year -0.001 
2011, second half year -0.001 
2012, first half year -0.001 
2012, second half year -0.001 
2013, first half year -0.001 
2013, second half year -0.001 
Region 2 -0.001 
Region 3 -0.001 
Region 4 0.000 
Region 5 -0.001 
Region 6 0.000 
Region 7 0.000 
Region 8 0.000 
Region 9 0.000 
Region 10 0.000 
Eligible for home care in the past 30 days 0.000 
Application by patient 0.001 
GP applied on behalf of patient 0.000 
LTC provider applied on behalf of patient 0.000 
Regular application 0.000 
Application after emergency LTC 0.001 
Random sample getting full assessment 0.002 
Foreign descent: Turkey -0.006 
Foreign descent: Morocco 0.012 
Foreign descent: Suriname -0.001 
Foreign descent: Netherlands Antilles 0.011 
Foreign descent: Western -0.001 
Foreign descent: Other non-Western 0.000 
Household size 0.001 
Number of children 0.000 
Number of children in household 0.001 
Widowed in last year -0.009 
Widowed in last three months 0.013 
Standardized household incomee 0.000 
Wealth 0.000 
Homeowner 0.002 
Value of the homed 0.000 
A02 (Drugs for acid-related disorders) 0.000 
A03 (Drugs for functional gastrointestinal 
disorders) 
0.001 
A04 -0.004 
A06 (Drugs for constipation) -0.002 
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A07 (Antidiarrheals, intestinal anti-
inflammatory/anti-infective agents) 
-0.002 
A10 (Drugs used in diabetes) -0.001 
A11 (Vitamins) 0.002 
A12 (Mineral supplements) -0.001 
B01 (Antithrombotic agents) -0.001 
B02 (Antihemorrhagics) 0.004 
B03 (Anti-anemic preparations) 0.000 
B05 (Blood substitutes and perfusion 
solutions) 
0.004 
C01 (Cardiac therapy) 0.002 
C02 (Antihypertensives) 0.004 
C03 (Diuretics 0.000 
C05 (Vasoprotectives -0.001 
C07 (Beta blocking agents 0.000 
C08 (Calcium channel blockers -0.001 
C09 (Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin 
system 
0.000 
C10 (Lipid modifying agents 0.000 
D01 (Antifungals for dermatological use -0.002 
D02 (Emollients and protectives 0.000 
D05 (Antipsoriatics 0.001 
D06 (Antibiotics and chemotherapeutics for 
dermatological use 
0.000 
D07 (Corticosteroids, dermatological 
preparations 
-0.001 
D11 (Other dermatological preparations -0.001 
G01 (Gynecological anti-infectives and 
antiseptics 
0.000 
G03 (Sex hormones and modulators of the 
genital system 
-0.002 
G04 (Urologicals 0.000 
H02 (Corticosteroids for systemic use) 0.001 
H03 (Thyroid therapy) -0.001 
H04 (Pancreatic hormones) 0.002 
J01 (Antibacterials for systemic use) -0.001 
J02 (Antimycotics for systemic use) 0.004 
J05 (Antivirals for systemic use) 0.003 
J07 (Vaccines) -0.004 
L01 (Antineoplastic agents) -0.001 
L02 (Endocrine therapy) -0.002 
L04 (Immunosuppressants) 0.003 
M01 (Anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic 
products) 
-0.001 
M04 (Anti-gout preparations) -0.001 
M05 (Drugs for treatment of bone diseases) -0.001 
N01 (Anesthetics) 0.001 
N02 (Analgesics) -0.001 
N03 (Anti-epileptics) 0.000 
N04 (Anti-Parkinson drugs) -0.005 
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N05 (Psycholeptics) 0.001 
N06 (Psychoanaleptics) 0.000 
N07 (Other nervous system drugs) 0.002 
P01 (Antiprotozoals)   -0.001 
R01 (Nasal preparations) 0.000 
R03 (Drugs for obstructive airway diseases) 0.000 
R05 (Cough and cold preparations) 0.001 
R06 (Antihistamines for systemic use) -0.002 
S01 (Ophthalmologicals) 0.000 
S02 (Otologicals) 0.003 
V03 (All other therapeutic products) 0.001 
Y (ATC code not filled in) -0.003 
Spending on home care last year 0.000 
Spending on home care two years ago 0.000 
Spending on nursing home care two years ago 0.000 
  
Number of observations 51047 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. p-values are adjusted for multiple testing. 
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Table A5 OLS estimates of the association between eligibility for a nursing home 
admission (ENHA) and the outcome measures 
 A NHA within: 
 3 months 6 months 1 year 1.5 year 2 year 
Effect of ENHA (γ) 0.257 
(0.004)*** 
0.304 
(0.005)*** 
0.321 
(0.006)*** 
0.290 
(0.006)*** 
0.269 
(0.006)*** 
Number of observations 51047 51047 51047 44261 44261 
 
 Mortality:     Having ≥ 1 
hospital admission 
 3-months 6-month 1-year 1.5-year 2-year Next year 
Effect of ENHA (γ) 0.022 
(0.002)*** 
0.035 
(0.003)*** 
0.046 
(0.004)*** 
0.055 
(0.004)*** 
0.065 
(0.005)*** 
-0.022 (0.008)*** 
Number of observations 51047 51047 51047 51047 51047 29391 
 
 Medical care expenditures Nursing home care 
expenditures 
Home-care expenditures 
 Next 
calendar year 
Next 2 
calendar 
years 
Next year Next 2 years Next year Next 2 years 
Effect of 
ENHA (γ) 
-866.1 
(132.1)*** 
5577.2 
(322.4)*** 
8861.3 
(151.2)*** 
15888.1 
(380.8)*** 
-3117.3 
(200.4)*** 
-7756.8 
(416.2)*** 
Number of 
observations 
44064 44064 51047 44261 51047 44261 
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Appendix B: The assessment procedure 
 
The application 
 
Individuals who may need LTC – or a healthcare provider or family member on their behalf – 
apply for an assessment by filling out a printed or online form and sending it to the LTC 
needs assessment agency (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg – CIZ) in their region32. This form 
contains information on: i) the patient’s health problems; ii) the patient’s functional 
limitations; iii) the care that the patients would like to receive; and, iv) some of the patient’s 
background characteristics, including marital status and household composition. 
Subsequently, the application is reviewed by a screener, who determines if the application is 
valid and, if so, whether it may be approved by a back office employee33 or if it should be 
reviewed by an assessor. In the latter case, the screener also determines the review procedure 
to be followed: the abridged procedure (the majority – desk research and phone interviews), 
the standard procedure (face-to-face interview, if needed with a translator – always required 
in case of a forced admission (wet Bijzondere Opname Psychiatrisch Ziekenhuis)34) or the 
expanded procedure (face-to-face interview and review by a multidisciplinary team, which 
includes medical staff).  
 
Applications are assigned randomly to assessors 
 
The planner assigns the applications to assessors. An assessor evaluates roughly three 
standard-procedure applications or seven abridged-procedure applications per day and the 
vast majority of the assessors do both types of assessments. Assessors handle one of three 
types of applications – for elderly care, care for the disabled or long-term mental health care 
– but there is no further specialization. When assigning cases to assessors, the planner does 
not take information about the patient’s health or care needs into account but rather the 
priority status of the application35 and the workload of the assessors.  
 
There are a few exceptions to the random assignment of assessors. First, novice assessors get 
a reduced load of about five applications per day and may start by assessing relatively 
straightforward applications, e.g. applications of individuals with only a few limitations and 
no other complicating factors. Second, some characteristics of the assessors, which are most 
likely unrelated to patient’s health or care needs, may play a role in the assignment of cases. 
For instance, when planning home visits, which are often part of the standard-procedure 
assessments, the travel time of assessors is taken into account and hence assessors are more 
likely to assess individuals who live close to their home town.36 Third,  assessors fluent in a 
                                                          
32 We use data from 2009 through 2013. The number of regions decreased from 36 in 2008 to 10 in 2012 
(RIVM 2008, 2012). 
33 Back-office employees handle delegated reassessments (Herindicatie via taakmandaat – HIT)33, applications 
for types of care for which a standard procedure is available (Standaard Indicatieprotocol – SIP) and 
applications of elderly of 80 years and older (Indicatiemeldingen – since 2012)). These types of applications are 
often directly approved. However, a small number of the applications are checked by an assessor (Lindeboom et 
al. 2016). HITs are checked before the decision is made; SIPs are checked afterwards. 
34 Applications for which the provider indicated that there may be a need for a forced admission are not in the 
data. 
35 All applications must be handled within six weeks. However, some applications need to be handled within 24 
or 48 hours. 
36 Only 14 percent of the assessment procedures in our study population included a home visit is. 
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foreign language may be assigned more applicants who are fluent in that language but not in 
Dutch37.  
 
Assessors handle applications on their own, but may discuss difficult cases with other – 
possibly more experienced – assessors. This implies that these other assessors may have an 
influence on the decision. Finally, screeners may handle the simplest cases themselves. The 
data show that it is unlikely that this applied to any of the applications in the study 
population. 
 
The assessment 
 
At the start of the assessment, the assessor has access to: i) information that is filled out on 
the application form; ii) information about prior LTC use; and, iii) the information  collected 
when previous applications were assessed38. He/she decides which information needs to be 
verified or updated and which information is missing. To verify what is known or to obtain 
new information, the assessor may contact the patient, household and/or family members, the 
health insurer and healthcare providers (e.g. the GP or a LTC provider), who provide much of 
the information that the assessor uses and are often involved in filling out the application. 
Most of the information is gathered or verified by making semi-structured phone calls. The 
time it takes to complete an assessment depends on how much information needs to be 
verified or updated. If most of the information is already available from previous 
applications, the assessor often only needs to check for any changes in the patient’s situation.  
 
According to the assessment framework, the assessor takes into account the health, health-
related limitations, living conditions, social environment, psychiatric and social functioning 
of the applicant and any other professional services and informal care the patient is  
receiving. However, the assessor has the freedom to determine which of these aspects are 
relevant and therefore determines which information is verified or collected.39,40 A random 5 
percent sample of the applications41 gets a full review. 
 
The eligibility decision and follow-up 
 
The assessor decides about the types and amounts of LTC for which the applicant is eligible . 
For some situations that can easily be defined, as there are guidelines to recommend a certain 
level or type of care as a function of needs. Applications for which it is not clear a priori 
whether home care or institutional is the most appropriate are considered to be among the 
most difficult.  
When an applicant is considered eligible for institutional care, the assessor is supported by an 
automatically generated recommendation when deciding on the type and level of institutional 
care. This recommendation is based on the information on the functional limitations 
registered. The assessors have the discretionary power to deviate from the amount of care 
                                                          
37 Applicants who were not fluent in Dutch were often invited for consultation at times when an interpreter was 
available. 
38 Reassessments are not done by the same assessor. 
39 Any preferences indicated on the application form do not play a role, according to the documentation about 
the assessment procedure (CIZ 2013). According to the assessor we interviewed, these preferences only 
incidentally play a role when making the eligibility decision. 
40 Availability of sufficient capacity to deliver the care that the applicant is eligible for is not taken into account 
by the assessor; assessors have no information on the availability of LTC supply.   
41 With the exception of HITs and SIPs. 
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suggested in the guidelines and from the recommendations made by the algorithm. They do 
not need to motivate their decisions, though they may explain their decisions to the applicants 
and their families to improve their understanding of the process and the outcome.  
 
A new eligibility decision fully replaces the previous one. If the applicant does not agree with 
the decision, he/she may appeal and the decision is reconsidered.42 The initial decision is 
usually only reversed because new or additional information regarding the patient’s situation  
becomes available.  
  
                                                          
42 The applicant appeals in less than 1percent of cases and. 25percent of these appeals are approved (CIZ 2014). 
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Appendix C: The Lasso procedure 
As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis with a much larger set of covariates 
including very detailed information on outpatient medicine use and diagnosis information 
from hospital admissions from the year leading up to the assessment.43 When the number of 
covariates is relatively large in relation to the number of observations, there is a considerable 
risk of overfitting (i.e., the model estimates are not generalizable to other, similar, datasets). 
Overfitting is also of concern in the 2SLS context, as the predicted probability of EHNA (first 
stage) is used as a covariate in the second stage. To reduce the risk of overfitting, we used the 
Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (Lasso) developed by Tibshirani (1996) to 
select relevant covariates in a data-driven way. The Lasso attempts to select covariates in 
such a way that the resulting model strikes a balance between high performance and 
parsimony. It achieves this through shrinkage, in which coefficients are penalized to shrink 
them towards zero. Coefficients belonging to irrelevant covariates are shrunk stronger 
towards zero.  Estimates for the coefficients are found by minimizing the sum of the squared 
residuals plus a penalty term on the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients: 
?̂?𝛽 = arg min𝛽𝛽{(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽)2 + Φ‖𝛽𝛽‖1} (5) 
The penalty term restricts the size of the model. The penalty parameter φ determines the 
severity of the penalization. An advantage of the Lasso, compared to, for instance, ridge 
regression, is that it often shrinks coefficients exactly to zero. This means that the Lasso can 
be used to select the most relevant variables. 
 
We followed the approach discussed by Belloni et al. (2014), who adopted the Lasso in a 
2SLS context. Their approach (see Belloni et al., 2012) differs somewhat from the standard 
Lasso in that it introduces penalty loadings next to the overall penalty 𝜑𝜑 in the target 
function: 
?̂?𝛽 = arg min𝛽𝛽 �(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽)2 + 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 ‖𝛢𝛢𝛽𝛽‖1�, (6) 
where 𝛢𝛢 is a 𝑘𝑘 × 𝑘𝑘 diagonal matrix, and where the 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡ℎ diagonal element 𝛢𝛢𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is a penalty 
loading that corresponds to the 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡ℎ regression coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘. In other words, each regression 
coefficient is penalized differently, to deal with potential heteroscedasticity in the covariates. 
Belloni et al. (2012) suggest a method to estimate the coefficient-specific penalty loadings in 
𝛢𝛢 in a data-driven way, such that the loadings are asymptotically valid, even under non-
Gaussian and heteroscedastic errors. They found that using this version of Lasso in 
combination with 2SLS leads to considerable improvement in the precision of the LATE 
estimate. 
Following the approach for applying the Lasso in a 2SLS context suggested by Belloni et al. 
(2014), we ran the Lasso separately for three equations: first to select the variables correlated 
to the leniency score, second the eligibility decision, and third the outcome variable. We then 
ran a 2SLS regression using all variables with non-zero coefficients in at least one of these 
equations as covariates. 
                                                          
43 Specifically, we added the categories of the International Shortlist for Hospital Morbidity Tabulation 
(ISHMT) and all ATC level 4 codes to the set of potential covariates.  
